Originality by Bryden, David P.
ORIGINALITY 
Some people suspect that law professors lead a soft life. As I 
have often explained to my wife, this is only superficially true. How 
many architects or doctors have tried to figure out a new argument 
against strict construction, or a new reason for freedom of speech? 
Which is easier, treating acne or complying with the bluebook? De-
signing a living room, or defining equal protection? It's pleasant to 
chat in the faculty lounge, but on the frontiers of scholarship life is 
hard. 
All of us are capable of summarizing the scholarly consensus 
on a legal matter; the difficulty, especially in constitutional law, is 
finding something new to say. One familiar way to mitigate this 
problem is by joining a school of thought, and then applying the 
methods of that school to discover new slants on old issues. In con-
stitutional scholarship, several examples come to mind: Critical 
Legal Studies, Law and Economics, Straussianism, neo-Kantian 
philosophy, Radical Feminism, and hermeneutics. Unfortunately, 
these solutions produce mixed results. For example, let us weigh 
what you would gain and lose by becoming a Marxist. On the one 
hand, you would have an instant answer to every legal dilemma 
from the origins of legal formalism to the role of the Supreme 
Court. You would also be armed with an imposing scholarly appa-
ratus: words like "reification" baffie commercial lawyers, and serve 
to keep them in their place, thus preserving the one legitimate hier-
archy. Better still, as a Marxist you would be entitled to patronize 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Herbert Wechsler, and even Ronald 
Dworkin. What more could a legal scholar ask? 
As the boxer Sonny Liston's manager said, speaking of the for-
mer champ's run-ins with the police, "Sonny has his good points. 
The trouble is his bad points." The disadvantages of becoming a 
Marxist are almost as great as the advantages. Since you can be 
labelled and dismissed ("He's one of those Crits"), some bourgeois 
moron at an unaccredited night school can patronize you. One of 
life's little ironies is that Marxism has a leveling effect on a scholar's 
apparent brilliance, making him seem better than his betters to 
some readers, but worse than his inferiors to others. The same is 
true of most if not all schools of thought. 
I have another solution to the problem of how to write an orig-
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inal article. My solution rests on an obvious but often forgotten fact 
of intellectual history. It is known to continental deconstructionists 
as Koeppen's Axiom. According to this axiom, the great truths of 
every era were regarded as ridiculous by nearly all cultivated think-
ers during a previous era. We all know this, but we commonly 
overlook Bryden's Corollary: Much of what we regard as ridicu-
lous today will be regarded as self-evidently valid and terribly im-
portant tomorrow. It follows that you can write a great law review 
article by defending preposterous ideas. 
As you know, several public law scholars have discovered this 
truth. For the benefit of any who have not, I will offer an illustra-
tive anecdote. I missed my main chance to write a great article. In 
about 1967, irritated by some activist decision, I grumbled, "The 
next thing you know people will argue that children have constitu-
tional rights." A distinguished senior colleague laughed heartily at 
that absurd crack, and scared me off, leaving others to claim the 
credit for my idea. 
I'm a slow learner. My next idea was the Rights of the Ugly. 
It was on a list of possible article topics that I discussed with an-
other senior colleague several years ago. He frowned: "It sounds 
too much like a parody." Not yet fully aware of Bryden's Corol-
lary, I took this as a fatal objection. In fact, of course, it was a sign 
of genius: all great constitutional ideas sound like parodies. Before 
long the Harvard Law Review appropriated my idea. The editors of 
The New Republic ridiculed Harvard's piece on discrimination 
against the ugly, but what do they know? They aren't even im-
pressed by Roberto Mangabeira Unger. 
One rub, of course, is that your ridiculous ideas may continue 
to be regarded as ridiculous for some time to come, perhaps forever, 
or at least until long after you have departed for the Big Stacks in 
the Sky. The other rub is that once your idea ceases to be too ridic-
ulous it soon becomes too obvious, and soon thereafter may again 
become too ridiculous. Reich's Curve is the name that has been 
given to this phenomenon. Reich Optimality is the apex of the 
curve, the point at which an idea ceases to be ridiculous but has not 
yet become either banal or ridiculous (again}-the fleeting moment 
during which it is a creative insight. If you wish to write a great 
constitutional theory today, you need only find some argument that 
now sounds ridiculous, and will be ridiculous or trite after you are 
dead, but for which Reich Optimality will occur in your lifetime, 
long enough before senility to afford you plenty of time for enjoying 
the applause. 
Actually, Reich's The Greening of America isn't a perfect ex-
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ample, because-like most of us-Professor Reich caught a wave 
that was beginning to crest. His timing can best be classified as Late 
Reich Optimal. The more difficult feat is to devise an Early Reich 
Optimal thesis: to anticipate a wave when the water still looks flat 
to everyone else. It would be perfect, for example, to have advo-
cated balanced budgets in 1979. 
As another example, consider presidential power. You would 
gain a reputation for soundness, but not genius, by questioning the 
constitutionality of undeclared wars today, now that everyone 
knows the evil purposes that they serve. Much worse, you would 
have lost your job if you had inveighed against undeclared wars in 
1940, 1950, or even 1960. Criticisms of the "imperial presidency" 
became Early Reich Optimal when John Kennedy decided to visit 
Dallas. 
Or take stare decisis. An article finding profound virtues in 
fidelity to precedent would have been Early Reich Optimal in Octo-
ber 1980. Nine years later the idea has lost much of its freshness, 
and by 1996 it may be the dullest platitude in constitutional juris-
prudence. In 1935 or 1965, on the other hand, .... 
If you had advocated rape shield laws in 1930 you would have 
been denied tenure and died as a crazy and much despised reaction-
ary, insensitive to the rights of the accused enshrined in the con-
frontation clause. If you advocate them today, you are merely 
sensible. But if you had advocated them as a youngster of thirty, in 
1960, and endured several years of scorn, you'd be famous today. 
Maximum hour and minimum wage laws that apply to women 
but not men, as in Muller and Adkins, are unpopular today, but 
were considered essential in Brandeis's time. Wouldn't you like to 
have attacked them in 1962 or so, on the eve of the great outpouring 
of feminist literature? For some reason, no one did. 
Suppose you had declared, in 1970, that pornography subju-
gates women. For a while, life would have been tough; but you'd be 
a hero today, maybe even lauded as The Father of Feminism. 
You would gain little by attacking Holmes's opinion in Buck v. 
Bell, upholding compulsory sterilization of mental defectives, now 
that everyone knows that it was, as one treatise puts it, "callous." 
If, on the other hand, you had attacked Buck in 1927, just after the 
decision was handed down, Professor T. R. Powell of Harvard 
might have mocked you instead of Justice Butler, in his famous line 
about "two generations of imbeciles are enough, Mr. Justice Butler 
dissenting." Imagine: "Two generations of imbeciles are enough, 
Professor Steve Krupchak dissenting." 
For opponents of eugenics, Reich Optimality seems to have oc-
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curred sometime between 1936, when Drew Pearson's Nine Old 
Men quoted T. R. Powell gleefully, and 1942, when Skinner v. 
Oklahoma was decided. In late 1941, perhaps. 
The idea of saving the world through litigation has had its ups 
and downs. If you had argued in 1935, 1953, or even 1963 that "the 
citizen does not need a bureaucratic middleman to identify, prose-
cute, and vindicate his interest in environmental quality," because 
with liberalized standing rules citizen suits can do the job, you'd be 
selling shoes in Oshkosh today. If you were to say it in 1989, you'd 
be regarded as a rather odd duck. But in 1971, when a prominent 
law professor penned that line, the idea was (Late) Reich Optimal. 
Speaking of litigation, what if you had argued in 1906, the year 
after the Court's infamous decision in Lochner v. New York, that the 
Supreme Court's job is to discover and enforce the best American 
values, a function that politicians can't perform as well because 
they're afraid of the voters? While you might have survived, life 
would hardly have been worth living. Today, on the other hand, 
your colleagues fall asleep in their chairs when they read that politi-
cians are scoundrels and Justices are prophets. To be Early Reich 
Optimal in defense of judicial activism, you had to publish around 
1950. By 1996, who knows? 
An idea may be unpopular, and yet Reich Optimal because at 
another time it would have been even less popular. Indeed, Richard 
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law (1972) is one of the few exam-
ples of Early Reich Optimality. Richard Epstein's Takings was not 
exactly trendy even though it came out during the Reagan years. 
But what if it had been published in, say, 1938? Would anyone even 
have bothered to refute it? By 1980, Epstein would have been long 
forgotten. Makes you wonder, doesn't it, how many "mute, inglori-
ous Epsteins" lie buried in Chicago churchyards. 
It is, of course, devilishly difficult to figure out which of the 
ideas that now sound ridiculous will be triumphant tomorrow. The 
very nature of the enterprise requires all of our intellectual courage 
and independence. Need I say more? 
D.P.B. 
